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The difficulties in effective engagement with the global trade environment,
especially given the rules-based system of world trade applicable to member states
of the World Trade Organisation, are a constant subject for academic and political
discourse, particularly when developing countries are involved. One consideration is
however often overlooked: the internal constraints which must be faced in these
countries along with their added obligations to comply with modern liberalization
processes. This article studies these constraints by identifying the challenges facing
one of sub-Saharan Africa’s largest economies in constructing a stable legal frame-
work for trade and development, which meets domestic needs and complies with
the demands of the global market environment.
INTRODUCTION
Long ruled under successive military governments,1 Nigeria’s comparatively
low level of socio-economic advancement has determined its long status as
a “developing country”, notwithstanding its vast mineral resources, arable
land and human capital. A member of the old General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), ten years into its membership of the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) Nigeria’s manufacturing and other production processes
were still beset by “infrastructural inadequacies, high cost of finance, adverse
effect of an upsurge of imports and consequently low capital utilisation”.2
Agriculture still employs the highest percentage of labour (mostly unskilled)
in Nigeria, largely located in rural areas. The largest contribution to Nigeria’s
economy is from natural resources. As at 2006, crude oil specifically remained
* PhD (Kings College, London), LLM (Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen), BL (Nigeria),
LLB (Ife). Lecturer in law, Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen. Email: e.ezeani@rgu.ac.
uk. The author remains indebted to the anonymous reviewers of this article for their
invaluable comments.
1 After gaining independence from the British colonial government in 1960, Nigeria saw a
brief period of civilian rule from 1960 until 1966 when the military first intervened in
Nigerian politics. Still under military rule, the bloody Nigeria-Biafra civil war took
place from 1967 to 1970. There were military interventions, mostly by means of coups
d’état, on 15 July 1966, 29 July 1966, 29 July 1975 and 13 February 1976. The military
eventually handed power to a civilian led government in 1979. In 1983, the military
returned again and remained in power until 1999, under successive military coups.
2 See WTO “Trade policy review: Report by Nigeria”: WT/TPR/G/147, 13 April 2005 at 6.
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Nigeria’s largest export commodity, contributing about 45 per cent to the
country’s GDP, 95 per cent of her export earnings and 70 per cent of total gov-
ernment revenue. However the sector employed only about 5 per cent of the
country’s labour force.3 Gas is fast becoming another mining sub-sector con-
tributor. The creation of Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Limited in May 1989
was a step forward in efforts to diversify the mining sector.4
This article offers a background to economic and development policy-
making in Nigeria. It evaluates aspects of Nigerian legislation in comparison
with WTO rules and considers regulations affecting investment and private
sector participation. It highlights in particular the problems with the 2009
central bank interventionist reforms, as well as considering the capacity for
local firms to engage in trade in services. The article also considers domestic
efforts at improved market access within the African region. The conclusion
is that there needs to be a limit on continuous (and inconsistent) executive
attempts at policy-making without a determined focus as to what polices
are required and how those policies can be made effective.
INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS AND EXTERNAL RULES
The development plans after the country’s independence from British colo-
nial rule in 1960 drew a relationship between the country’s activities in inter-
national trade and domestic socio-economic advancement; the early
nationalists saw the successes of both areas of development in improved
industrialization and self sufficiency. It was however to prove more difficult
to adopt a steady pace towards development:
“Emphasis was placed on accelerated development of the economy through
expansion in the nation’s industrial base. The idea was for the country to be
able to at least produce some of her consumables locally and in effect reduce
dependence on external sources for the supply of such items. To be able to
finance the imports necessary for the prosecution of the industrialisation pro-
gramme, exports of cash crops which were then the main source of foreign
exchange had to be enhanced. Thus, farmers were encouraged to expand
3 See WTO “Trade policy review Nigeria: Report by the secretariat”: WT/TPR/S/147, 13
April 2005 at ix. The most recent WTO trade policy review of Nigeria reiterated these stat-
istics noting that, while they employ few people, oil and gas make up over 90% of exports
and 80% of government revenue. The review also found that “although the petroleum
sector dominates the economy, agriculture is more important to most Nigerians as it
represents over half of employment”. See WT/TPR/S/247/Rev.1, 1 August 2011 at paras
1 and 9.
4 The company’s shareholders include the national petroleum company and foreign mul-
tinationals also engaged in the crude oil sub-sector: Nigeria National Petroleum
Corporation, 49%; Shell Gas BV, 25.6%; Total LNG Nigeria, 15%; and ENI International
(NA) NV, 10.4%. Other gas projects by Chevron Nigeria Ltd and Exxon Mobil are expected
to increase the contribution of the gas sub-sector in the future.
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their production of cash crops with guaranteed external markets by the
Marketing Boards. The export basket consisted of cocoa, palm produce, rubber,
groundnut, ginger, and some solid minerals, coal and tin.
The insatiable urge to quicken the pace of development gave rise to heigh-
tened demand for imports, which in turn exerted pressures on the balance of
payments. Consequently, the trade policies had to be restrictive in order to
moderate the demand pressures. Exchange control measures were then intro-
duced to adjust the demand for foreign exchange to the available supply so as
to maximise the use of reserves by ensuring that essential imports were
accorded priority over other imports in the use of foreign exchange resources.
Also, in order to give effect to the import substitution industrialisation pol-
icy, trade barriers in the form of imports licensing was [sic] put in place to
complement imports tariffs in the control of import [sic], as well as protect
domestic industries that were set up to produce import substitutes.
The customs tariff structure was deliberately discriminatory, biased in
favour of capital goods and raw materials. Items considered as luxury goods
were either put on [sic] import prohibition list or had very high import tariffs
placed on them. In terms of directional flow of trade, Nigeria’s imports and
exports were concentrated in the Western Hemisphere, although not as a
deliberate policy, but due to historical inheritance.”5
The outbreak of the civil war, the subsequent reliance on the oil sector as a
quick foreign earner after the war, and the unstable political environment
with another return to military rule in the 1980s meant that these and
other development policies did not benefit from continuity.6 The frequent
interruptions to Nigeria’s political structure, and military governance,
meant that the country’s trade policies and development-related regulations
were subjected to sporadic changes. Between 1960 and 1977, the country
had gone through four development plans.7 The fourth national development
plan (in 1977), which was the foundation for subsequent economic pro-
grammes, was regulated by the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act 1977, an
amendment of an earlier 1972 decree. This regulation was subsequently
amended again in 1989.8 Referred to as the Indigenization Decree, the act
restricted foreign participation in the Nigerian economy. It was not essentially
5 See FCO Analogbei “Trade reforms and productivity in Nigeria” (Central Bank of Nigeria
paper, 31 Dec 2000) at 160–61, available at: <http://www.cenbank.
org/OUT/PUBLICATIONS/OCCASIONALPAPERS/RD/2000/ABE-00-9.PDF> (last accessed 7
December 2011).
6 See id at 161. By the mid 1970s, increases in international crude oil earnings to the
country brought euphoria, but with damning consequences. The previous trade restric-
tions, geared towards improving local industries, boosting the agricultural sector and
encouraging the growth of infant industries, were relaxed.
7 See generally Analogbei “Trade reforms and productivity in Nigeria”, above at note 5.
8 The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act is no longer in force. However its essential pro-
visions have remained, but with an allowance for more foreign direct investment, under
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intended to promote the creation of industries or to liberalize the Nigerian
market. The intent of the act was effectively to protect Nigeria’s economy
from foreign acquisition by reserving certain enterprises for Nigerian citi-
zens.9 Remarkably, this restrictive regulation did not help in improving the
productive base of the country and did not enhance the industrialization pro-
cess as it was undoubtedly intended to:
“The indigenisation scheme did not achieve the desired objective, at least not
in the area of industrialisation. Most of the enterprises taken over by Nigerians
were mainly trading outfits whose major occupation was the importation and
marketing of foreign goods and services. Those of the enterprises that lay claim
to being industrial enterprises depended almost exclusively on imported
inputs. The Nigerians who purchased those trading outfits were contented
with the status quo and did little or nothing by way of establishing new indus-
tries. The government was perhaps a greater culprit in this regards [sic] as most
government owned enterprises or those in which government had a substan-
tial stake came under this category.”10
As such, whereas there was commercial activity in the form of the buying and
selling of goods, mostly imports,11 there was no major establishment of indus-
tries or production facilities for non-oil exports with a view to integration with
the global market.
THE OIL BOOM
Ironically, in the post-1970s period, much of the blame for the lack of continu-
ity in development policy is placed on the hitherto unforeseen increases in
international crude oil prices which brought significant financial results to
the Nigerian economy. According to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN):
“The sudden and unexpected increase in the prices of crude petroleum in 1973
coupled with the country’s low absorptive capacity, and the existence of var-
ious productive bottlenecks in the economy had by 1974 led to a situation
whereby the country was faced with [sic] surfeit of funds for which it had no
contd
the current Nigerian Investment Promotion Decree No 16 and Foreign Exchange
(Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No 17, both of 1995.
9 See the act in vol XVIII cap 303 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 1990. The areas
reserved exclusively for Nigerians included bread and cake making, hairdressing, gar-
ment manufacture, travel agencies, departmental stores and supermarkets.
10 See AS Pepple “The new business investments regulations: Implication and the dilemmas
of compliance” in IA Ayua (ed) Structural Adjustment and Nigerian Development; A Third
World Angle; Nigerian Current Legal Problems vols 4 and 5, 1996–98 (2000, NIALS) 159 at
165–66.
11 Highlighting the observations by Dr Okigbo noted below at note 15.
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immediate investment outlet internally… In the circumstance, it was thought
that the exchange control regulations needed further liberalisation.”12
The reliance on the huge wealth generated by the oil sector particularly in the
1970s and early 1980s proved to be the Achilles heel in the country’s economic
progress. Trade in crude oil was deemed sufficient to maintain the country’s bal-
ance of payments to the neglect of the previous emphasis on indigenous manu-
facturing and production. Foreign multinationals were engaged in exploration
and drilling of natural resources and successive governments were intent on pre-
serving the concessionary contracts with foreign multinationals and the earn-
ings, to the detriment of industrial advances in other areas. Despite numerous
government-led initiatives, the Delta region area, where the oil exploration activi-
ties are concentrated, still scarcely exhibits any real evidence of the profits.13
A descriptive account of Nigeria’s trade and economic activities in the “oil-
boom era” portrays the internal challenges and the adverse impact on the
socio-economic structures of the oil dependent economy:
“In 1971, the share of agriculture to GDP stood at 48.23 per cent. By 1977, it had
declined to almost 21 per cent. Agricultural exports, as a percentage of total
exports, which was 20.7 per cent in 1971, reduced to 5.71 per cent in 1977.
The discovery of oil in commercial quantity in the mid-1950s, coupled with
the oil-boom resulting from the Arab oil embargo on the USA in 1973, affected
the agricultural sector adversely. The economy became heavily dependent on
oil. While the boom afforded the government much needed revenue, it also
created serious structural problems in the economy.
The agricultural sector was most hit. Rural urban migration increased, as
people attempted to reap or benefit from the windfall from oil. Production
of agricultural commodities for export declined. Food production became a
problem. Starting from 1974, the economy became a net importer of basic
foods. Huge foreign exchange earnings were utilised in importing food.
Nonetheless, prices of foodstuff remained high. Policies like the government’s
Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) programme could not reverse the deteriorat-
ing food situation. Government was involved in direct food production, pro-
vided subsidies to peasant farmers and created more commodity boards for
various agricultural and food products.
Policy makers advised the government not only to embark on ownership
and control of the commanding heights of the economy like the petroleum
12 CBN Twenty Years of Banking in Nigeria (1979, CBN), quoted in Analogbei “Trade reforms
and productivity in Nigeria”, above at note 5 at 162.
13 Compare with K Ebeku “Niger Delta oil, development of the Niger Delta and the new
development initiative: Some reflections from a socio-legal perspective” (2008) 43/4
Journal of Asian and African Studies 399. The problems of governance and the conflicts
in the region are examined in NS Akpan “Governance and communal conflicts in a post-
democratic Nigeria: A case of the oil-producing Niger Delta region” (2010) 2/3 Journal of
African Studies and Development 65.
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and mining sectors, but also to be directly involved in banking, insurance,
clearing and forwarding, among others. With the promulgation of the
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree in 1972, Government became directly
involved in virtually all aspects of the economy, especially as foreign exchange
was thought to be no longer a constraint to development.
This era had its problems. Primitive accumulation intensified. Corruption,
theft, real estate speculation, outright looting of government treasury and
other fraudulent practices prevailed. The State, on its own, intensified the cre-
ation of a business class that depended solely on government contracts rather
than on production. The gap between the rich and the poor widened consider-
ably. Ad-hoc and ill-conceived government policies exacerbated the problem.
For example, the 100 per cent salary increase of 1975, tagged the Udoji
Salary Award, was disastrous for the economy as prices increased by more
than 100 per cent. The payment of a year’s arrears of the increase in salary,
further worsened the situation.
The exchange rate regime encouraged imports. The economy was heavily
dependent on imports; almost everything was imported, from toothpicks to
toothpaste dispensers. There was no serious attempt to invest the windfall
from oil in viable projects. Except for the huge expenditures on education
and construction of dual carriage highways in some parts of the country,
Nigeria would have had nothing to show from the oil boom era.”14
Revisiting the causes of Nigeria’s inability to make significant use of her
reserves, leading to chronic balance of payment difficulties by the early
1980s, one of Nigeria’s foremost economists Dr Pius Okigbo reasoned that
the problem was due to the over-valuation of the naira, particularly during
the oil boom period. He observed that:
“The naira was obviously over-valued; it had been for twenty years, a managed
currency whose value in relation to the dollar was maintained by fiat …
Because the over valuation made Nigerian made goods relatively more expens-
ive than equivalent imports, commercial policy was addressed to closing the
Nigerian market officially to some of those imports through bans, prohibi-
tions, high tariffs, etc … Because our local manufacturers procured their
equipment and spares and intermediate inputs relatively cheaply from abroad
in consequence of the external exchange rate of the naira, they could not be
persuaded either by their long term interests or by the prodding of the govern-
ment to turn to local sources for their raw materials and intermediate goods.
Our engineers and nascent engineering industries saw no future in the local
fabrication of equipment and machinery. These tendencies fastened on our
14 “Oil boom era (1971–77)” OnlineNigeria, available at: <http://www.onlinenigeria.com/eco
nomics/?blurb=490> (last accessed 30 November 2011). The period referred to is 1971–
81.
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economy further dependence on imports and therefore, a growing deficit in
the balance of payments.”15
With the slump in oil prices in the mid 1980s, dependence on oil was clearly
not in the country’s long term interests. Accepting the tight lending con-
ditions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the military government
embarked in 1986 on a stringent programme of market reform: the
Structural Adjustment Programme.
THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME – AN OVERVIEW
Largely blamed for the downward spiral of the country’s economy and the cre-
ation of the harsh living standards which sustained largely into the new mil-
lennium, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was promoted with the
intention to:
• restructure and diversify the productive base of the economy in order to
reduce dependence on the oil sector and on imports;
• achieve fiscal and balance of payments viability;
• lay the basis for sustainable non-inflationary or minimal inflationary
growth and;
• lessen the dominance of unproductive investments in the public sector,
improve the sector’s efficiency and intensify the growth potential of the
private sector.16
The programme was to achieve these objectives by:
• the adoption of a realistic exchange rate policy coupled with the liberali-
zation of the external trade and payments system;
• monetary and credit restraint;
• the adoption of appropriate pricing policies in all sectors, with greater
reliance on market forces and a reduction in complex administrative
controls;
• further rationalization and restructuring of public expenditure and cus-
toms tariffs;
• privatization and commercialization of public sector enterprises; and
• debt rescheduling and debt conversion.17
SAP altered the indigenization attempts with its policies of a liberalized mar-
ket, a focus on export promotion, and currency devaluation. While the pro-
gramme, embarked upon in 1986, suggested that the country could
integrate into the global economy by adopting the stated policies, the effect
on the overall development dimension either was not considered relevant
15 See P Okigbo “SAP and financial intermediaries (1)” (31 August 1987) The Guardian
(Nigeria) at 7.
16 B Ogunleye “Why SAP was adopted, by Sanusi” (5 September 2001) The Guardian (Nigeria)
at 27.
17 Ibid.
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or was deliberately ignored.18 Whereas government regulation and direct par-
ticipation in economic activities had been the norm, the introduction of a
badly structured (or simply unstructured) market-regulated economy meant
that government regulation, fundamental to the orderly implementation of
market based reforms and development programmes, became an arbitrary
exercise under the frantic efforts to liberalize the Nigerian market.
Moreover, it meant that the lack of capacity to produce competitive finished
goods for the global market, as opposed to offering very basic raw materials
characteristic of most developing economies, was not addressed. A writer
notes that: “the efficacy of SAP to address Nigeria’s development problems
are restricted by factors which are external to the state, and are common to
all Third World states. These issues include the peripheral nature of the
state to the international economy.”19 This “peripheral nature” nature of the
Nigerian state to the international economy is described in the following
manner:
“The core issue in this relationship pertains to the peripheral status of Nigeria
as an underdeveloped state vis à vis the developed capitalist states which are
the owners of the capital, technology, etc which are needed for Nigeria’s devel-
opment … [I]f it is accepted that the capitalist system of development requires
raw material input which must be supplied for the system to continue, then it
also has to be acknowledged that some states must provide these materials.”20
Elsewhere, the author comments: “the underdeveloped states provide the raw
/ primary materials for producing finished goods which are subsequently
exported to the developing state”.21
The free trade principles of the WTO were nevertheless of importance to the
country’s external relations, particularly with her trading partners. In order to
ensure that the country fulfilled her obligations within the domestic environ-
ment, certain domestic rules and policies had to be put in place. However,
there was still the beneficial constraint of free-flowing oil wealth.
SAP in all its various stages of implementation was severely criticized in the
national press.22 Apart from indications that the data which formed the basis
of government and IMF support for the programme were not largely
18 SAP was ostensibly terminated in 1993 but its hardships endured beyond the exit of its
initiating government, the regime of the former military leader, President Ibrahim
Babangida.
19 See OA Odiase Alegimenlen “Structural adjustment and Nigerian development; A third
world angle” in Ayua (ed) Structural Adjustment and Nigerian Development, above at note
10, 28 at 45.
20 Id at 38–9.
21 Id at 36.
22 See for example N Achime “A case against SAP” (15 March 1989) National Concord (Nigeria)
at 3; G Sogolo “The blessings of SAP” (1 May 1989) The Guardian (Nigeria) at 9; B Ogundele
“Whatever happened to SAP?” (25 October 1991) The Guardian (Nigeria) at 13.
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consistent with the facts on the ground,23 the causal factor to the lack of econ-
omic and developmental progress under SAP had been established early on:
“The basic philosophy behind SAP is that the economy was over regulated and
that the road to salvation lies in relaxing the hold of the public authorities on
the economy … There is no doubt that the administration of import licences,
the process of export promotion, the management of the money supply left
much to be desired … Under the SAP regime, these are made more responsive
to the forces of the market place.
However, the market is not as convex as the protagonists would have us
believe, nor are the results as smooth and trouble-free as we would expect
from a perfectly competitive market system. Where we are is in the limbo
where the elimination of export licences does not do away with foreign
exchange scarcity, where money supply is constrained both by the constriction
of the monetary bases and by a deliberate squeeze of liquidity, and where pro-
motion of exports of non-oil commodities is constrained by structural inelas-
ticity, administrative bottle necks and lack of domestic credit.”24
SAP did not have a significant impact in lowering inflation, improving the
debt situation, improving living standards or in establishing viable local
industries.25 The domestic environment had to contend with these factors
which appeared more urgent than global market integration. However,
GATT had evolved into a rules-based system at the WTO with a single under-
taking requirement for all of its members.
NIGERIA AND THE WTO
Nigeria ratified the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO (WTO
Agreement) in December 1994, becoming a founding member of the organiz-
ation when it came into operation in January 1995.26 WTO membership
required a different obligation from that which had subsisted in the relation-
ship between previous governments and the adopted market reforms. The
practice has been that:
“The Nigerian government and the donor agencies have largely played a
cat-and-mouse game, with the government signing on to the reforms while
23 See P Mosley “Policy-making without facts: A note on the assessment of structural adjust-
ment policies in Nigeria 1985–1990” (1992) 91 Journal of African Affairs 227.
24 Okigbo “SAP and financial intermediaries (1)”, above at note 15.
25 By 1995 Nigeria owed US$ 35.6m; as at 1985 it had been US$ 18.9m. See Nigeria Debt
Management Office reports at: <http://www.dmo.gov.ng/oci/edebtstock/docs/External
%20Debt%20Outstanding%20(1983-2004).pdf> (last accessed 30 November 2011).
26 See “Nigeria: June 1998” (WTO press release, 16 June 1998), available at: <http://www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp75_e.htm> (last accessed 30 November 2011). The WTO
Agreement was signed on 15 April 1994.
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failing to implement the agreed policies. In some cases, one could discern the
actual policies by examining the implementation record. For example, while
the tariff regime is (on paper) more liberal than before, the frequency of the
reversals (sometimes reversed a few times in one year) render [sic] the pub-
lished tariffs inoperative. Even with the liberalised foreign exchange market,
the market still operates a dual regime thus providing significant rents for
those with access to the foreign exchange at the official rate.”27
WTO membership however required visible participation: the ability to make
available goods which could be traded in the global market. It also demanded
compliance with trade liberalization principles: the removal of trade barriers
and an open trading system. The WTO undertaking had little room for flexi-
bility or arbitrariness in the implementation of the organization’s many agree-
ments. In 2004, realization of this demand for Nigeria’s membership would
prompt the new civilian government to set up a committee to review the
WTO agreements. It was expected that: “the Committee will look into the
WTOAgreementwith a viewof reviewing and ensuring that Nigerian industries
are protected, and that the national economy is encouraged to growand expand
and that everythingwill be donewithin the approved regulations to ensure that
the dumping of goods into the Nigerian economy is prohibited”.28
This comment offers an insight into the general perceptions of the impli-
cations for the obligations Nigeria has incurred as a member of the WTO.
Three provisions of the WTO Agreement effectively dissuade the possibility
of an accession country “reviewing” the WTO Agreement as suggested.
First, article XII of the WTO Agreement presumes capacity to enter into the
WTO Agreement: “[a]ny State or separate customs territory possessing full
autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the
other matters provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade
Agreements may accede to this Agreement, on terms to be agreed between
it and the WTO.” Nigeria may rebut this presumption of capacity to accede
on the basis that the country’s accession to the WTO was a politically motiv-
ated act by the unpopular military government at the time. This does not how-
ever detract from the fact that the country entered into an agreement with
other countries under the WTO.
Secondly, a suggestion that the WTO Agreement may be “reviewed” is not a
proper interpretation of the WTO obligations. Article II(2) of the WTO
Agreement provides that: “[t]he agreements and associated legal instruments
27 See NI Ikpeze, CC Soludo and NN Elekwa “Nigeria: The political economy of the policy
process, policy choice and implementation” in C Soludo, O Ogbu and H-J Chang (eds)
The Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy in Africa: Forced Consensus? (2004, Africa World
Press / IDRC), available at: <http://web.idrc.ca/en/ev-71263-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html> (last
accessed 7 December 2011).
28 See “Reviewing the WTO treaty” (editorial) (28 October 2004) This Day (Nigeria) at 11, quot-
ing the then information minister, Prof Jerry Gana.
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included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Multilateral Trade
Agreements’) are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members.”
By these provisions, the WTO operates a “single undertaking” requirement.
This means that a member state has undertaken the binding nature of obli-
gations arising under the various multilateral agreements, negating any
attempt at a unilateral review under the rules.
Thirdly, the WTO Agreement expects a practical implementation of
the agreements in the legal realm of member states. Accordingly it provides:
“[e]ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
Agreements.”29
Furthermore, article XIV(2) states: “[a] Member which accepts this
Agreement after its entry into force shall implement those concessions and
obligations in the Multilateral Trade Agreements that are to be implemented
over a period of time starting with the entry into force of this Agreement as if
it had accepted this Agreement on the date of its entry into force.”
The above notwithstanding, there were still suspicions as to the effect of the
WTO Agreements:
“It is the view of many in the developing world that the WTO Agreement oper-
ates effectively to prise open markets for the benefits of trans-national corpor-
ations at the expense of national economics, considering that WTO rules insist
that international corporations be treated equally with local companies …
[s]tudents of globalisation are beginning to point to newly emerging features
which make prompt action necessary at this time, if developing nations are
to stem their further marginalisation occasioned by the globalisation
phenomenon.”30
The view that Nigeria and the developing world are being “marginalized” is
however not generally upheld, as the statement above may suggest. The obser-
vation above can be contrasted with this comment by a Nigerian economist:
“If reports on the debate in the House of Representatives as to whether Nigeria
should continue her membership or not is [sic] to be reckoned with, it clearly
shows that the debaters have little understanding of the functions of the mul-
tilateral trading system … if most members … are of the view that WTO is the
cause of poor industrial performance in the country, then the real issue is not
being addressed. No one should be left in doubt that the bane of industrial
performance in the country is the accumulation of bad domestic policies
which made the cost of doing business in the country perhaps the highest
29 WTO Agreement, art XVI(4).
30 See C Nwuche (deputy speaker, Nigeria House of Representatives) “Nigeria and the World
Trade Organisation” (speech) (6 March 2002) The Guardian (Nigeria) at 70.
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in the world thereby reducing the country’s competitiveness in the world
market.”31
Nigerian laws and WTO agreements
It is true that the WTO rules are not directly applicable in Nigeria since they
have not been formally enacted into Nigerian law by Nigeria’s National
Assembly, pursuant to section 12 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria.32 However, a review of relevant Nigerian legislation
shows the awareness of international obligations in the context of multilateral
trade, particularly in the areas of trade liberalization and decreased govern-
ment participation (deregulation). It must be pointed out that there is no
reference in these provisions that they were made pursuant to the WTO
Agreement provision that member states should bring their laws, regulations
and administrative procedures into line with their WTO commitments.33 The
relevant Nigerian legislation covers:
Protection of intellectual property
Intellectual property (IP) is protected in Nigeria under the Copyright Act, as
amended in 1992 and 1999,34 the Trade Marks Act35 and the Patents and
Designs Act.36 The Copyright Act 1999, including a new section 4f, extends
IP protection to WTO members, as envisioned under the national treatment
provisions of article 1(3) of the WTO Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Agreement (TRIPS):37
“Members shall accord the treatment provided for in this Agreement to the
nationals of other Members.38 In respect of the relevant intellectual property
right, the nationals of other Members shall be understood as those natural
31 See A Adeyemo “Should Nigeria pull out of WTO?” (8 October 2005) Nigerian Tribune at
12.
32 See the decision of the Nigerian Supreme Court in Abacha v Fawehinmi (2000) 6 NWLR pt
660 at 288 confirming that “an international treaty entered into by the government of
Nigeria does not become binding until enacted into law by the National Assembly”.
33 WTO Agreement, art XVI(4). See generally P Usoro’s commentary on the paper titled “The
legal status of WTO and the newmaritime legal regime” (delivered at the maritime semi-
nar for judges organized by the Nigerian Shippers’ Council / National Judicial
Commission, Abuja, Nigeria, June 2008), available at: <http://www.paulusoro.com
/publications/Commentary%20on%20 The%20 Legal%20 Status%20of%20WTO%20etc%
20by%20Dr%20Omo-Eboh(%20v1).doc> (last accessed 30 November 2011).
34 Vol V cap 68 LFN 1990; Decree No 48 1992; Decree No 42 1999.
35 Cap 436 LFN 1990.
36 Vol XIX, cap 344 LFN 1990.
37 TRIPS is annex 1C of the WTO Agreement.
38 Note the note to art 1(3) of TRIPS: “When ‘nationals’ are referred to in this Agreement,
they shall be deemed, in the case of a separate customs territory Member of the WTO,
to mean persons, natural or legal, who are domiciled or who have a real and effective
industrial or commercial establishment in that customs territory.”
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or legal persons that would meet the criteria for eligibility for protection pro-
vided for in the Paris Convention (1967), the Berne Convention (1971), the
Rome Convention and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of
Integrated Circuits, were all Members of the WTO members of those
conventions…”
Section 4(A)(1) of the Copyright Act extends copyright protection in Nigeria to
every work at least one of the authors of which is a citizen or body corporate of
a country which is a party to any international agreement to which Nigeria is a
party. Under section 4(A)(1)(b), protection is also extended to any work first
published in any country which is also a party to any international agreement
to which Nigeria is a party. By extension, the most favoured nation (MFN) pro-
visions of article 4 of TRIPS are also protected with this extension of rights to
cover IP of non-Nigerian origin.
Protection of cultural rights which developing countries fear may be
exploited arises under section 29(A) of the Copyright Act 1999. This section
provides for criminal liability for the infringement of any “expression of folk-
lore”. There is no further indication of the scope this provision is to cover; per-
haps the term “expression of folklore” is expected to cover music, film, dance
and literature.
Collectively, Nigerian laws on IP rights do not provide for protection of indi-
genous innovation in areas of health and medicine, foods and agricultural
processes, or any other research and development processes. This differs
from the TRIPS provisions, which extend to copyrights, patents, industrial
design, computer and computer data, wine and spirits, lay-out designs of inte-
grated circuits, and the control of anti-competitive practices in contractual
licences. For example, under section 4(b) of the Nigerian Patents and
Designs Act, patents cannot be obtained for “plant or animal varieties, or
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals
other than microbiological processes and their products”. Section 5 of the
act also states that: “[p]rinciples and discoveries of a scientific nature are not
inventions for the purposes of this Act.”
These provisions contrast with section 27.3(b) of TRIPS, which provides:
“[m]embers shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents
or by an effective sui generis [unique] system or by any combination thereof.” In
effect, research and scientific discovery into plant varieties in Nigeria do not
have first protection under Nigerian IP laws. This makes it possible for foreign
research bodies, which have the requisite advanced technologies and can
undertake scientific experiments, to claim first protection over a plant
variety.39
39 In the India-US basmati rice dispute, India challenged the US government grant of a
patent to a US company (RiceTec Inc) which allowed the company to label its cross-breed
product of basmati and American long grain rice “basmati”, a name hitherto used to
refer to a variety of the rice plant grown in India and Pakistan. The US Patent Office
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The principal conflict between domestic laws and TRIPS lies in the fact that
the latter seeks for MFN principles to be applied in Nigeria which, in its cur-
rent state of under development, lacks the extensive range of IP property
that TRIPS covers. Furthermore, easy acquisition of foreign technological pro-
cesses which aid industrial development is hindered by the range of rights
granted.40 There is also the fact of compulsory jurisdiction under the WTO’s
dispute settlement body (DSB) for the protection of IP rights, which further
limits the powers of domestic laws over IP protection.
Dumping and subsidies
The Nigerian Customs Duties (Dumped and Subsidised Goods) Act41 is estab-
lished to “authorise the imposition of customs duties where goods have
been dumped or subsidised, and to make provision for matters connected
therewith”.42 Section 3 of the act treats dumping and adverse subsidization
on imported goods together. The president is conferred “in the national inter-
est” with the power to “impose and vary duties of customs in such manner as
he thinks necessary to meet the dumping or the giving of the subsidy”.43 The
power to impose duties is subject to the provisions of GATT 194744 and is pro-
vided for under section 4 of the act.
Section 2(a) of the act defines imported goods as dumped if the export price
of the goods from an originating or export country is less than the “fair market
price” of the goods in that (originating or export) country. Section 3 defines a
subsidy as the giving “directly or indirectly” of any “bounty or subsidy” whether
by grant, loan, tax relief or in any way including special subsidies on transport
of a particular product. Subsidies also refer to any favourable treatment which
assists a reduction in the prices for exports of a product.
With respect to anti-dumping, the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement45
interpretation of what constitutes dumping is more detailed. Article 2 of
this agreement determines a situation of dumping as: “[a] product is to be con-
sidered as being dumped, ie introduced into the commerce of another
country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported
contd
eventuallyupheld India’s assertions that the “basmati” ricehadbeen in thepublicdomainas
ithas always beencultivated in India. See the applicationhistoryofpatentNo. 5663484, avail-
able at: <http://www.google.com/patents?id=eiMnAAAAEBAJ&printsec=abstract&zoom=
4&source=gbs_overview_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false> (last accessed 7 December 2011).
40 The National Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion oversees the registration
and transfer of foreign technology in Nigeria, including responsibility for ensuring
that foreign technology imported into the country is not overpriced or obsolete.
See generally the National Office of Industrial Property Act, vol XVII cap 268 LFN 1990.
41 Vol Vc cap 87 LFN 1990.
42 Id, preamble.
43 Id, sec 3.
44 The act has not been amended to reflect Nigeria’s membership of the new WTO.
45 The WTO Anti-dumping Agreement is under annex 1A of the WTO Agreement.
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from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary
course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting
country.” (Emphasis added)
Under the WTO rules, the goods must be introduced at less that their “nor-
mal” value, not less than the “fair market price” as provided for in the Nigerian
act; furthermore the goods must be compared to “like products”.46 Where
there are no like products, the margin of dumping is determined by: “com-
parison with a comparable price of the like product when exported to an
appropriate third country, provided that this price is representative, or with
the cost of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable amount
for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits”.47
In the case of subsidies, the relevant WTO agreement is again detailed as to
what constitutes a subsidy. The WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Agreement (SCM Agreement)48 provides that a subsidy exists when a benefit
is conferred where: government practice involves a direct transfer of funds
including grants, loans, equity infusion and loan guarantees; government rev-
enue is foregone or not collected including tax credits; a government provides
goods or services other than general infrastructure or purchases goods; or a
government entrusts another body to do any of these things.49
Article 3(1) of the SCM Agreement limits the prohibition of subsidies
(excluding the provisions in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture50 to those
contingent on “export performance” or those contingent “upon the use of dom-
estic over imported goods”. This is in contrast to the Nigerian provision
which includes the prohibition of subsidies on the “production or export of
goods”.51
With respect to both dumping and subsidies, the real test is in the rigorous
determination of the two measures under the WTO rules.52 There is the expec-
tation that “investigating authorities” will carry out any allegations of dump-
ing which are raised by the manufacturers of domestic “like products” who
46 Sec 9 of the Nigerian act refers to the price at which the goods are sold in the ordinary
course of trade, subject to necessary adjustments including conditions and terms of sale,
taxation etc. In the view of the author, there is a difference between the two provisions:
the “value” of goods may not necessarily be reflected in the price of the goods. For
example, goods may be valued at £50, but sold at a cheaper price, say, “£50 for two” in
the course of a promotion. A very common example is this: a bottle of US marketed
washing liquid which usually contains 1 litre of the detergent is normally sold at $2;
during a promotion a bottle has an extra litre but is to be sold at the price of one
litre, a fact clearly stated on the bottle. Invariably, the goods are offered for sale in Nigeria
at their “value” which is interpreted as the market equivalent of more than $4 per bottle.
47 WTO Anti-dumping Agreement, art 2(2).
48 The SCM Agreement is under annex 1A of the WTO Agreement.
49 See SCM Agreement, art 1(2).
50 The Agreement on Agriculture is under annex 1A of the WTO Agreement.
51 See Customs Duties (Dumped and Subsidised Goods) Act, sec 3.
52 See WTO Anti-dumping Agreement, arts 5, 6, 9, 11, annexes I and II; and SCM Agreement,
arts 11–17 and 19.
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feel the imports are threatening.53 Such an investigating authority has not
been provided for under Nigerian law.
Articles 23 and 13 of the WTO SCM and Anti-dumping Agreements respect-
ively, provide that member states whose national legislation contains pro-
visions on countervailing duty measures “shall maintain judicial, arbitral or
administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the
prompt review of administrative actions relating to final determinations
and reviews”. The Nigerian law has not been amended to reflect this provision.
Preferential Treatment
The special and differential treatment provisions in the different WTO agree-
ments apply to Nigeria as well, in her WTO status as a developing country.
Under the Trade (EEC Preferences Under the Lomé Convention) Act,54
Nigerian legislation incorporates the WTO notified trade co-operation
between the African-Caribbean-Pacific and the European Union. By virtue of
section 1 of this act, the Nigerian director of the Department of Customs
and Excise is empowered as the certifying authority for goods exported
from Nigeria under the agreement.
There is also the Trade (Generalised System of Preferences) Act55 which is
established in line with the WTO preferential treatment provisions under
the generalised system of preferences (GSP) scheme. The certifying authority
for goods exported under the GSP scheme is the Nigerian Department of
Customs and Excise.56
Pre-shipment inspection
Nigerian legislation provides for two forms of pre-shipment inspection (PSI),
in the Pre-shipment of Exports Decree No 10 and the Pre-Shipment of
Imports Decree No 11, both of 1996.
Under the “exports” legislation, no goods except those listed57 shall be
exported from Nigeria unless an inspecting agent, appointed by the head of
state under section 12 of the decree, has issued a clean certificate of inspection
to the oversees buyer of the goods.58 The Central Bank of Nigeria is responsible
for the general administration of the provisions of the decree.59
53 See WTO Anti-dumping Agreement, art 5(1).
54 Vol XXIII cap 434 LFN 1990.
55 Vol XXIII cap 435 LFN 1990.
56 Id, sec 1.
57 Exempt are objects of art, explosives and pyrotechnic products, arms, ammunition,
weapons, implements of war, animals, household and non-commercial products. See
the Nigerian export prohibitions list in the Customs, Excise Tariff etc (Consolidation)
Decree No 4 of 1995. The government however also periodically lists prohibited export
or import items; these lists are available at: <http://www.customs.gov.ng/Prohibition
List/import.php> for imports and <http://www.customs.gov.ng/ProhibitionList/export.
php> for exports (each last accessed 7 December 2011).
58 See Pre-shipment of Exports Decree, sec 1.
59 See id, sec 13.
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The “imports” legislation contains similar provisions60 but does not man-
date PSI for “explosives and pyrotechnic products, arms and ammunition,
weapons and implements of war; supplies to diplomatic missions and inter-
national organisations for their own needs, such other goods as may be prescribed
by the Federal Government of Nigeria from time to time.”61 (Emphasis added)
Although the legislation (section 7 on imports and section 18 on exports) on
PSI each provides that failure to comply with the national pre-shipment laws
will amount to an offence, there is no provision for an appeals procedure on
pre-shipment grievances as directed by article 2.21 of the WTO Pre-Shipment
Agreement (WTO PSI Agreement).62 This may be the case if it is understood
that the Nigerian laws govern Nigerian citizens alone. However, this interpret-
ation may not suffice. Both Nigerian PSI decrees refer to “oversees” buyers and
sellers: buyers and sellers may be governments. It is therefore not clear
whether the Nigerian situation perceives a PSI “offence” as covered by the
Nigerian provisions alone. Furthermore, the independent review procedures
provided for under article 4 of the WTO PSI Agreement are not reflected in
both decrees. Neither is there any reference to dispute settlement under the
DSB pursuant to article 8 of the WTO PSI Agreement.
It is not legislation alone however that is relevant to considerations of trade
and development policy-making in Nigeria. Given the importance and impact
of investment in facilitating trade, the extent and capacity for private sector
involvement in this area merits some consideration. This article therefore
addresses regulations on investment and private sector participation next.
OPEN TRADE, INVESTMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR
PARTICIPATION
One of the fundamental characteristics of international trade as envisaged by
the WTO is the liberalization of markets for cross-border access, including for
investment purposes and for trade in services, both of which involve the pri-
vate sector.
Open trade and regulations on investment
The WTO Trade Related Investment Measures Agreement (TRIMS)63 empha-
sizes this aspect of liberal trade. The Nigerian Investment Promotion
Commission Decree No 16 (NIPC Decree) and the Foreign Exchange
(Monitoring and Miscellaneous) Provisions Decree No 17 (FEMMP Decree),
both of 1995, make provisions for greater foreign investment participation
60 Sec 1 provides for pre-shipment inspection of imports; sec 4 vests the appointment of
investigating agency powers in the head of state; and sec 5 provides for general admin-
istration by the CBN.
61 See Pre-Shipment of Imports Decree, sec 1(5). The list of excluded goods is obviously
open.
62 The WTO PSI Agreement is under annex 1A of the WTO Agreement.
63 TRIMS is under annex 1A of the WTO Agreement.
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in the country’s economy.64 Section 1 of the NIPC Decree established the
Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission. Under section 4, the commis-
sion has the duty to “encourage, promote and co-ordinate” investment in
the Nigerian economy. There is no restriction on participation in a Nigerian
enterprise by a foreign investor who may establish an enterprise65 or pur-
chase, through the Nigerian Stock Exchange, the shares of any Nigerian enter-
prise in any convertible currency.66
An amendment under Decree No 32 of 1998 provides that, for an enterprise
in which foreign participation is permitted, a foreign investor complies with
national laws upon incorporation or registration under the Nigerian
Companies and Allied Matters Decree (Act LFN 1990). In the view of the author,
incorporation and not, alternatively, mere registration would have served the
same purpose and ensured a preferable level of compliance with other appli-
cable laws in the country.
The foreign investment initiative is aided by the FEMMP Decree which
establishes an autonomous foreign exchange market for transactions in
foreign exchange,67 monitored by the CBN.68 Any person may invest in
any enterprise or security with foreign currency or capital in Nigeria
imported by an authorized dealer,69 which may be a bank or any non-
banking body with sufficient resources to operate.70 Section 15(4) guaran-
tees unconditional transferability of funds to foreign currency invested in
any enterprise.
While the motives behind the establishment of these laws in Nigeria will
undoubtedly lie in pursuance of global economic integration, in the author’s
view, the corresponding need to improve on the development progress of the
country is not satisfied by these laws alone:
“Favourable legal framework for foreign investments does not necessarily guar-
antee that foreign investments will come. There are other factors, not least the
profit motive, which drive foreign investments. These include the degree of
political stability, the place of the Rule of Law, in the Legal System, the avail-
ability of critical skills as well as clear evidence that local investors invest
locally. Where most of the financial capital is invested or lodged outside, it
will prove difficult to convince foreign investors except perhaps in the extrac-
tive industries such as oil, that their investments are worth it.”71
64 The provisions of the NIPC Decree have been extended to cover petroleum resources
under an amendment (Decree No 32 1998).
65 NIPC Decree, secs 17, 19 and 20.
66 Id, sec 21.
67 FEMMP Decree, secs 2 and 7.
68 Id, sec 8.
69 Id, sec 15.
70 Id, sec 5.
71 See OC Eze Nigeria and the World Trade Organisation (2004, Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs) at 49.
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The protagonists of open liberalized trade believe in the reduction of govern-
ment control over a nation’s economic activities. The Nigerian Public
Enterprises (Privatisation and Commercialisation) Decree No 28 of 1999
(Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree) was, as the name suggests,
enacted in line with this view: to reduce government involvement in market
activities and encourage the participation of individuals and corporate bodies
(including foreigners) into a less restrictive market.
The National Council on Privatisation established under part II of the decree
is concerned primarily with determining the public enterprises to be priva-
tized or commercialized and approving the legal framework for these pur-
poses.72 There is reference to the view that the decision to deregulate the
Nigerian market should contribute to the nation’s socio-economic develop-
ment. Sub-section 11(a)(i) provides that the functions and powers of the coun-
cil include to “determine the political, economic and social objectives of
privatisation and commercialisation of public enterprises”, and to “review,
from time to time, the socio-economic effects of the programme of privatisa-
tion and commercialisation and decide on appropriate remedies”.
There is however no further suggestion as to how the council is to achieve
these targets. What the decree provides is for an implementation body, the
Bureau of Public Enterprise (BPE),73 with the main function of preparing pub-
lic enterprises approved by the council for privatization or commercialization,
including advising the council on further enterprises to be privatized or com-
mercialized, and carrying out all activities for the successful implementation
of the privatization and commercialization programme.74
The schedules to the decree list the enterprises affected. Some are to be par-
tially commercialized while others are for full commercialization, including
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, the Nigerian Industrial
Development Bank and the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry.75
Enterprises for full privatization include government owned companies in
the following sectors: petroleum; banks; motor vehicle and truck assembly;
cement manufacturing; agro-allied industries; and hotels.76 Partial privatiza-
tion has also been identified for companies in the following industries: tele-
communications; petroleum; fertilisers; steel and aluminium; mining and
solid minerals.77 Also affected are transport and aviation companies (includ-
ing the national carrier and the federal airports authority), the media, insur-
ance companies, and paper and sugar companies.78
72 See generally Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree, sec 11.
73 See generally id, part III.
74 See generally id, secs 13 (privatization) and 14 (commercialization).
75 See id, second schedule.
76 See id, part II, first schedule.
77 See id, part I.
78 Ibid.
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Private sector participation
This section of the article focuses on two dynamic areas of activity: the
Nigerian banking sector; and the potential and capacity for Nigeria’s growth
in the area of trade in services.
Banking
The move towards greater private sector participation is more visible in
Nigeria’s banking sector. Under the liberalization policies of the mid 1980s,
the country saw reforms in the financial sector mainly in foreign exchange
management, from a government-controlled to a market-determined
regime.79 This facilitated the emergence of private banking as a significant
industry. As at December 2003, there were 89 banks trading, with 3,282
branches around the country. Under a consolidation exercise initiated by
the then CBN Governor Charles Soludo,80 a more viable banking sector was
created, with 24 “well capitalised banks owned by the Private Sector”81 contribut-
ing in 2009 a commendable 40 per cent to the country’s GDP82 and about 20
per cent of the work force.83 The consolidation exercise aided market access
for the banks with 37 operating around Africa and nine outside Africa in
the same period.84 There was also an attempt to reduce government owner-
ship85 and, under the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria
post Consolidation, government equity holding in banks was limited to 10
per cent.86
Since the Nigerian financial market is not inured to the capital flight that
results when foreign investment is pulled out of shaky economies in times
of financial speculation, the sector was not unaffected in the global financial
crises of 2009. The news of the financial crisis only exacerbated the fears of the
possible complete collapse of the Nigerian financial market and renewed
speculation about the health of the banks. Although there had been no infor-
mation by the banks by way of admission that they were under threat of
79 See CC Soludo “50 years of central banking in Nigeria: The journey so far and the road
ahead” at 23, available at: <http://www.cenbank.org/cbnat50/papers/wadd.pdf> (last
accessed 30 November 2011).
80 Banks were required to have a minimum capital base of 25 billion naira.
81 CC Soludo “50 years of central banking” above at note 79 at 29 (emphasis original).
82 Id at 5.
83 Ibid. See also U Gunu “The impact of the banking industry recapitalisation on employ-
ment in Nigerian banks” (2009) 11/3 European Journal of Social Sciences 486. Other efforts
at development policy initiatives adopted by the banking sector under the supervision of
the CBN at the time include: granting licences for the purposes of microfinance; and
entrepreneurship development centres for the purpose of assisting private entrepre-
neurship activities.
84 Id at 29.
85 See T Beck, R Cull and A Jerome “Bank privatization and performance: Empirical evi-
dence from Nigeria”, available at: <http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=95647> (last accessed
30 November 2011).
86 Sec 5.1.2 (1 March 2006).
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failure, the CBN, under a new governor, Sanusi L Sanusi, and supported by the
executive, embarked on a range of pre-emptive reform strategies.
It may still be too soon to analyse the results, but it is not clear whether the
action by the CBN will be to the country’s benefit given that the reforms
appear to represent a return to the previous practice of government involve-
ment in banks, albeit through the CBN.87 Investigations into the internal
activities (including corporate governance)88 of several high profile banks by
way of reforms under the new CBN governor have already seen the removal
from office of eight bank chiefs on criminal charges of fraud.89 Criticizing
these moves, it has been noted that:
“From the beginning, the reforms were based on wrong assumptions. Some of
which were that if the bank chiefs were sacked, bad loans would be recovered
quickly, other bank chief executives would be frightened into observing bank-
ing regulations and the public’s confidence in the banks would increase.
Things have worsened since then. The banks have had to sack many of their
staff at the instance of new managements CBN installed, lending has ceased,
even businesses that legitimately obtained loans from banks have been
hounded to repay them, with the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission, EFCC, called in to give bite to the loan recovery drive.”90
Rather surprisingly, there has also been a call, including to foreign investors,
for interest in purchasing these so-called failing banks,91 in addition to the
establishment of an asset management institution, the Asset Management
Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON), to buy up the bad loans of the failing
banks.92 It is true that the Nigerian Stock Exchange gained 1.7 per cent on
87 See CBN Governor SL Sanusi’s interviews with The Financial Times (London) (21 June 2009),
available at: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/406e8650-ea69-11de-a9f5-00144feab49a.html
#axzz1fqnq0Fjh> (last accessed 7 December 2011).
88 See generally ENM Okike “Corporate governance in Nigeria: The status quo” (2007) 15/2
Corporate Governance: An International Review 173; and C Ogbechie, DN Koufopoulous and
M Argyropoulou “Broad characteristics and involvement in strategic decision making:
The Nigerian perspective” (2009) 32/2 Management Research News 169.
89 See CBN Governor SL Sanusi’s remarks in “Why we fired Akingbola, Ibru, Ebong, others –
CBN Governor Sanusi Lamido Sanusi” (15 August 2009) The Nation, available at: <http://
www.nigerianmuse.com/20090814214307zg/sections/spotlight-focus-on-issues/why-we-
fired-akingbola-ibru-ebong-others-cbn-governor-sanusi-lamido-sanusi/> (last accessed 30
November 2011).
90 See “One year of Sanusi reforms” (24 August 2010) The Vanguard (Nigeria), available at:
<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/08/one-year-of-sanusi-reforms/> (last accessed 30
November 2011).
91 See the Governor Sanusi’s interviews in The Financial Times, above at note 87.
92 See the CBN press release on AMCON after it received its third reading at the Senate:
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the news of the bill establishing AMCON being signed into law.93 Yet it must
be said that the efforts at reform have been “rapid, almost frenetic” and have
granted the CBN “a more interventionist role in the Nigerian economy”.94
Without going beyond the limits of this article, three issues deserve some
consideration. First is the legality of CBN intrusion into the internal arrange-
ments of the eight banks affected under the new reforms. The sacking and
subsequent imposition of managing directors (MDs) on the banks, followed
by the trial of the MDs of five banks (Oceanic International Bank,
Intercontinental Bank, Afribank Plc, Finbank Plc and Union Bank Plc) appear
contrary to the intent of sub-sections 33 and 35 of the Banks and Other
Financial Institutions Act 1991 (as amended) (BOFIA), upon which the CBN gov-
ernor relied. The drafters’ intentions behind the main provision relevant here,
section 35, which surely acknowledged the independence of the banks as par-
ticipants in the liberalization process of the financial sector, do not appear to
have been followed. The relevant section 35 states:
“(1) Where a bank informs the Bank that -
(a) it is likely to becomeunable tomeet its obligations under this Decree; or
(b) it is about to suspend payment to any extent; or
(c) it is insolvent; or
(d) where, after an examination under section 32 of this Decree or other-
wise howsoever, the Bank is satisfied that the bank is in a grave situ-
ation as regards the matter referred to in section 32(1) of this Decree,
the Governor may by order in writing exercise any one or more of the
power specified in subsection (2) of this section.”
The powers set out in section 35(2) range from prohibiting the bank from
extending any further credit facility to removing any officer of the bank and
appointing another in their place. The critical question here is however: was
section 35(1) fulfilled? From the drafter’s use of the term: “[w]here a bank
informs the Bank”, it is only reasonable to presuppose the implied indepen-
dence of the bank itself whether in the first instance, admitting its limitations
under sub-sections 35(1)(a)–(c), or (and only in the alternative given the word-
ing of the act), by accepting the report of the examination to be undertaken in
contd
COM%20Bill.pdf+CBN+press+release+on+AMCON+after+ it+ received+ its+third+reading+at
+the+Senate&ct=clnk> (last accessed 12 December 2011). The AMCON bill was signed into
law in July 2010.
93 See K Ighomwenghian “NSE gains 1.7 percent after AMCON bill gets presidential assent”
(26 July 2010), available at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201007261387.html> (last
accessed 30 November 2011). See also the Nigerian Stock Exchange report on trading
activities for July 2010, available at: <www.nigerianstockexchange.com/news/pdfs
/Annual%20Reports.pdf> (last accessed 7 December 2011).
94 See D Alford “Nigerian banking reforms: Recent actions and future prospects” Social
Science Research Network Working Papers (19 April 2010) at 14 and 20.
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section 32 pursuant to section 31(1)(d). In either case, it is expected that the
bank (and by implication its investors including shareholders) ought to be
aware of the “bank’s failure”, the extent of the investigations carried out,
and the resulting report.95 This was not the case.
The second issue relates to private sector participation and the indepen-
dence of the corporate entity in law. The question dwells on the position of
banks in Nigeria: are they companies, or financial entities under the supervi-
sion of the government via the CBN? Surely banks have separate legal person-
ality as companies protected under the country’s Companies and Allied
Matters Act (CAMA).96 If so, liability for any wrong-doing is borne by the offi-
cers who are appointed by the company and act for it.97 In turn, the officers
including directors are accountable neither to the government nor to its offi-
cial organs, but to the company to which they must act in “utmost good
faith”.98 Referring to remuneration, CAMA expressly provides that “a director
who receives more money than he is entitled to, shall be guilty of misfeasance
and shall be accountable to the company for such money”.99 There is pro-
vision for the removal of directors100 by the shareholders.101 CAMA, part
VIII provides for actions by or against the company, ie minority actions.
Where there is a suspicion that “the affairs of the company are being con-
ducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly dis-
criminatory against a member or members” or, whether in addition to the
preceding circumstances or alone, “in amanner which is in disregard of the pub-
lic interest” a petition to the court on the grounds of “unfairly prejudicial and
oppressive conduct” can be brought against the alleged offenders.102Where pub-
lic interest is affected, the Corporate Affairs Commission (the Commission) is
charged with investigating the claims and petitioning the court.103
If followed, the provisions of CAMA suffice to oversee the allegations of
embezzlement and internal mismanagement under the new reforms. The
CBN’s intervention under BOFIA duplicates and, in an overreaching manner,
assumes the task of the Commission. It is true that the CBN has an interest
in the regulation of banks, but this should only be to the extent that the bank-
ing activity complies with the provisions of the licence issued to the particular
bank. The Commission, which oversees the administration of companies,
should be better equipped to deal with internal problems of companies’
administration regardless of the type of company; the same is to be said for
95 BOFIA, secs 31 and 32.
96 Cap 59, LFN 1990.
97 Id, secs 63 and 244–45.
98 Id, secs 279–80.
99 Id, sec 267(6).
100 Id, sec 262.
101 Id, sec 283.
102 Id, sec 311. The petition can be brought by a member, an officer or former officer, credi-
tor, the Corporate Affairs Commission or “any person”, at the court’s discretion.
103 Id, sec 7(c). The Commission is established under part I of the act, which it administers.
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the courts which ultimately exercise jurisdiction over these matters. The
duplication of responsibilities across the sector,104 and this is not only an
issue in the financial sector, creates an unnecessary bureaucratic burden on
the legal system and constrains the emergence of effective private sector invol-
vement in enterprise. By their first nature as companies, banks have share-
holders who are directly affected by the health status of their investments
and who should be given first consideration in revisiting their management
(and auditors) unless there is a supervening impossibility, a situation which
has clearly not been the case here.105
Thirdly, regardless of the successful conviction of one of the deposed
MDs,106 why does BOFIA, which was first enacted as a decree in 1991, still con-
tain these provisions? It would have been preferable and more in line with the
efforts at encouraging a market-driven banking sector, not to mention instil-
ling the rule of law and due process in the legal economy, if the allegations of
embezzlement and mismanagement arose out of shareholder action against
fraudulent management and irregular accounting, and not by a caveat of
the CBN after its investigations. Forfeited assets would therefore revert back
to the market, ie to the shareholders and the bank, and not to the government
or an official organ as is now the case.107
Trade in services
Following from the discussions above, it is important to consider more gener-
ally the enabling environment for trade in services within the Nigerian ser-
vices industry.108 The WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS)109 sets out rules for market access to service providers based on four
modes of supply: cross-border supply, where services are supplied within
the territory of another member state; consumption abroad, where a service
is delivered outside the territory of a member state to a service consumer of
the member; commercial presence, where a service is delivered within a
104 Note also that the Securities and Exchange Commission has its own Code on Corporate
Governance of which banks which are listed as companies on the Nigerian Stock
Exchange are expected to take cognizance.
105 Shareholder action is only recent in Nigeria; it is hoped that similar action as shown by
the shareholders of Cadbury Nigeria in their suit against the management and auditors
of the company, which saw the removal of its managing and finance directors in 2006,
will be the practice across the private sector, instead of intervention by an official organ
of government.
106 At the Federal High Court, Lagos, FHC/L/297C/2009 (judgment of 8 October 2010) Chief
Mrs Cecilia Ibru, MD of the Oceanic Bank, received a suspended jail term of 18 months
(to serve six) and was to forfeit 199 assets worth over a 190 m naira.
107 The forfeited assets in the case above were to be handed over to AMCON.
108 See further EC Ezeani “Carpe diem! Developing countries and global trade in services”
(2007) 2/3 AE&E Business and Commercial Law Newsletter available at: <http://www.aean
delegal.com/dynamicdata/flash/AE&E%20Business%20&%20Commercial%20Newsletter
%20-3-2007.doc> (last accessed 12 December 2011).
109 GATS is annex 1B of the WTO Agreement.
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member’s territory through the commercial presence of the supplier such as a
representative or a wholly owned subsidiary or branch; and presence of natu-
ral persons, where a service is delivered within a member’s territory, for
example by persons working for a company of another member state.
There are hardly any indigenous firms providing services outside Nigeria;
but here again, banks have made a head start. Given this background, there
are few firms that can compete in the global services market, including
those who can do so in the context of the country’s liberalization pro-
grammes. This article will consider the provision of advisory services to the
privatization exercise under the trade liberalization policy of privatization.
In its Privatisation Handbook, the BPE, charged with overseeing the privatization
programme, makes provision for what it refers to as “merit based appli-
cations” for expressions of interest from those interested in acting as privatiza-
tion advisers. These merit based applications demand four considerations as
bases for prequalification:
• qualification of staff and their individual experience in handling similar
assignments in Nigeria and abroad;
• evidence of track record in a similar industry or transaction in Nigeria or
elsewhere in the world;
• intended approach to the assignment (work-plan); and
• proof of alliances or partnership with other competent domestic and
international advisers who have the requisite qualifications, experience
and track record in the industry or transactional type.110
Of the four, only the third, which in essence demands nothing more than a
skill in drafting schedules and presentations for such assignments, can be
readily provided by local firms. The local market for consultancy in this area
of privatization and commercialization of government enterprises is limited;
the services required are not part of the daily practice of the service industry in
Nigeria.111 It is difficult to see why these provisions were therefore included in
the policies for the privatization programme, which was supposed not only to
stimulate socio-economic development but also incorporate a greater number
of local service providers. Clearly, the services market in Nigeria will require
greater incentives for private entrepreneurship and expansion for a start
within the West African region. An option is of course for local firms to
seek long-term working partnerships with foreign professional service provi-
ders. This will ensure that there are local firms with the capacity to engage
in such specialized activity as envisaged under the provisions of the
Privatisation Handbook.
110 BPE Privatisation Handbook (2000, BPE) at 75.
111 Successful expressions of interest for consultancy in the current privatization pro-
gramme of the successor companies of the national electric company, previously
known as the National Electric Power of Nigeria, now Power Holding Company of
Nigeria, have been by African Finance Corporation, CPCS Transcorp, Goldman Sachs /
Stanbic IBTC, IPA Energy, Lazard / UBA and Standard Chartered Bank.
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IMPROVING MARKET ACCESS
Successive Nigerian governments have imposed various trade restrictions
through export and imports prohibition lists,112 all based on an attempt to
bolster fledgling domestic industries. However, at present, the country’s
trade regime significantly encompasses a wider range of activities than the
maintenance of tariff structures and barriers. In order to ensure stronger par-
ticipation in the WTO, a new enlarged and enhanced National Focal Point has
been established under the Federal Ministry of Commerce to co-ordinate the
country’s activities in international trade (including at the WTO and other
trade-related international organizations).113 This body is expected to assist
in Nigeria’s negotiations at the international level. The WTO has records of
notifications in respect of the various WTO agreements by Nigeria on the
WTO member information website.
A new industrial policy was adopted in 2003. This was to be overseen by the
Federal Ministry of Industry and was concerned with facilitating Nigeria’s
development, especially in terms of industrial progress. The policy’s objectives
included “strengthening the competitiveness of Nigerian manufacturers by
facilitating access to technology and best practices” and ensuring that
Nigeria’s resources are not traded in their primary state.114 The target year
given for all-round improvement in the industrial sector was 2010, which
was questionable given the nascent stages of Nigeria’s technological advance-
ment and private sector involvement in the market.115
Efforts at improving market access are also made under more recent devel-
opment plans. A new economic strategy for the country, the National
Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS) based on the UN
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), was established in 2004 with,
among others, the target of poverty alleviation by the year 2015, itself a doubt-
ful target. The strategy, which is to be executed across all three tiers of govern-
ment (federal, state and local), will be overseen by an independent monitoring
committee. NEEDS is described as “Nigeria’s plan for prosperity”.116 The four
112 See the Export Prohibition Act, vol VIII cap 121 LFN 1990; Import Prohibition Act, vol X
cap 171 LFN 1990. The Customs, Excise, Tariff etc (Consolidation) Act, vol VI cap 88 1990
prohibits the exportation of maize (corn) and grain sorghum for the purposes of trade.
113 Inaugurated on 16 August 2001, the body had been previously established in 1994 but
was largely inactive.
114 See Federal Government of Nigeria Industrial Policy of Nigeria: Policies, Incentives, Guidelines
and Industrial Framework (2003, Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industry).
115 See “Nigerian textile factories may close after import ban lifted” (1 December
2010), available at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-01/nigerian-textile-facto
ries-may-close-after-import-ban-lifted.html> (last accessed 30 November 2011); F
Ugwoke and O Chima “Govt lifts ban on textile materials, toothpicks” (29 November
2010) This Day (Nigeria), available at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201011300682.html>
(last accessed 30 November 2011).
116 See Meeting Everyone’s Needs (2004, Nigerian National Planning Commission) (NEEDS
document) at viii.
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pillars of the programme are to: reorient values (eschewing corruption);117
reduce poverty; create wealth; and generate employment.118 NEEDS is based
on four main themes:
• promoting exports and diversifying exports away from oil;
• gradually liberalizing imports, harmonizing tariffs with Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) common external tariffs,
and using special levies and import prohibitions to protect local
industries;
• establishing a market-determined nominal exchange rate regime, and
avoiding overvaluation of the real exchange rate; and
• seeking debt reduction to make Nigeria’s debt service sustainable.119
The author considers NEEDS to be a reference plan for Nigeria’s economic and
social advancement, indeed a fifth development plan. However, two factors are
crucial here. First, the objectives under the programme can only be met with
legislative backing and practical implementation. Realistic financial projec-
tions and facilities for management in both the country’s budgetary and fiscal
policies have always hampered Nigeria’s economic policies.120 Secondly, elab-
orate though NEEDS was, after 2007 it has no longer been the focus of the gov-
ernment after the president at the time, Olusegun Obasanjo, left office.
This reveals the worrying trend of inconsistencies in policy-making and
adoption even under the recent civilian political dispensation. A new govern-
ment has always meant that a new economic policy will be adopted. This has
also been the case with NEEDS. In 2009, the late President Umaru Yar’Adua
(and his eventual successor, President Goodluck Jonathan) adopted a “seven
point agenda” aimed at addressing the objectives of the UN MDGs.121 In
addition, a new economic strategy was established, Vision 20-2020,122 which
aims to put Nigeria among the top 20 countries by 2020. The potential for
these policies to succeed where others have not remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, beyond establishing domestic development-related provisions,
harmonization of the tariff structures across the ECOWAS region is part of the
117 An effort addressed under the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission.
118 See NEEDS document at ix.
119 Id, part one, chap 3 at 22.
120 It was estimated that this socio-economic programme will cost the country about $4.5bn
in 2007 which was expected to come from oversees development assistance and, sub-
sequently, about $1.5bn from foreign direct investment. See id, part four, chap 11 at 116.
121 These include energy emergency, agriculture and food security, wealth creation and pov-
erty alleviation, land reform, security of lives and property, human capital development
including compulsory education for children, and transport development including
improved mass transit.
122 To see the policy through, “experts have declared that the country will require about N32
trillion worth of investment in the next 10 years, from 2010 to 2020”; see T Ailemen
“Vision 20 – 2020: Presidency strategizes for implementation” (19 June 2010) Daily
Champion, available at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201006210422.html> (last accessed
30 November 2011).
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market access initiatives currently being pursued by Nigeria. Along with the
other ECOWAS member states, Nigeria has agreed final plans for a uniform
cross-border policy, the common external tariff (CET). Proposals on the CET
had been gradually introduced in Nigeria since July 2005 and the ECOWAS
heads of state agreed that the CET will become operational across the West
African sub-region by January 2008. The harmonized regime sets the following
four band tariff structure of between 0 and 20 per cent on goods imported
into the sub-region: (i) 0 per cent on industrial machinery and equipment,
necessities and special medicaments such as anti-retroviral drugs; (ii) 5 per
cent on rawmaterials and other capital goods; (iii) 10 per cent on intermediate
goods; and (iv) 20 per cent on finished goods.123
In adopting the CET’s modalities for lowering import prohibition charges,
Nigeria has not however eliminated protection for certain industries, goods
of which attract a 50 per cent import charge. These include ethanol, olive
oil in bottles, textiles, plastics, rice and cigarettes.124 The proposed harmoniza-
tion policy was not altogether welcomed as a positive contribution by the
country’s private sector.125
On a broader scale, the New Partnership on African Development (NEPAD)
and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) are initiatives which
Nigeria has embraced as instrumental to both her domestic development
goals and her integration in the globalization process. AGOA is set in the con-
text of the US Trade and Development Act 2000 passed by the US Congress in
order to provide access for goods from the African continent to the US.126 The
act lists new market access provisions, particularly with respect to textiles and
apparel, while it maintains preferential treatment under the GSP for certain
imports from Africa.127 However, the supposed impact of AGOA may be lim-
ited in Nigeria, considering that the country’s primary export to the United
123 See “ECOWAS common external tariff now effective” (7 October 2005) Nigeriafirst, avail-
able at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200510070509.html> (last accessed 9 December
2011).
124 Ibid.
125 See R Okeke “Nigeria: Manufacturer’s claim ECOWAS tariff will be damaging” (20 March
2005) The Guardian (Nigeria), available at: <http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/8698.html>
(last accessed 9 December 2011). Opposition to the immediate implementation of the
policy was also expressed by Nigerian manufacturers under the umbrella organization,
the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture.
Their opposition was based on the view that Nigeria’s poor social infrastructure and
high cost of production puts the other ECOWAS member states at a distinct advantage
in producing cheaper and, hence, more exported goods than Nigeria. See “The
ECOWAS common tariff” (editorial) (30 July 2006) This Day (Nigeria), available at:
<http://allafrica.com/stories/200607311026.html> (last accessed 8 December 2011).
126 See title 1, US Trade and Development Act 2000 Public Law 106-200.
127 The US Department of Commerce has information on AGOA and eligibility require-
ments for countries and products available at: <http://www.agoa.gov/index.html> (last
accessed 8 December 2011).
 JOURNAL OF AFRICAN LAW
States (for which it is the biggest trading partner in Africa) is not textiles and
similar goods, but oil and oil-related products.128
The NEPAD strategy, formulated at the 37th Summit of the African Union in
July 2001, was the work of Nigeria together with Algeria, Egypt, Senegal and
South Africa under the mandate of the African Union. NEPAD’s principal
aim is for African leaders to find ways of addressing the challenges faced by
the African continent, including economic growth, development and
employment.129
CONCLUSION
Economic and development policy-making in Nigeria has so far been carried
out in one of two ways. There is either a rapid fire response to problems on
which basis legislation, largely speculative (to cover any eventualities), is
made, or arbitrary legislation is set out which may not correspond to the
needs and concerns of the Nigerian environment. In terms of practice, what
the government considers to be critical areas of action will be clear
from the extent of “reforms”, especially those involving punitive measures
which the government or its relevant agency undertakes. What is clear is
that virtually all action (or inaction) emanates from the executive: the govern-
ment or its official organs.
A number of problems arise with these modes of response: the obvious lack
of stable, long term policies; the lack of consideration of well-structured pol-
icies which are tailored to the Nigerian environment; the attendant prolifer-
ation of official organs, administrative and bureaucratic processes involved
in implementing economic policies and in countering corruption arising in
their implementation; and the difficulty in formulating legislation that can
incorporate the demands of a rules-based global market with the domestic
requirements of the country. In the view of the author, these constraints
are challenges for the country’s legislature, which, as the people’s representa-
tive, bears the task and has the burden of creating laws that can address trade
and development needs.
Furthermore, it cannot be overemphasized that the direct participation of
the organized private sector (OPS) and the contribution of trade and industrial
professionals is essential. The Manufacturers Association of Nigeria, Nigeria’s
128 See further S Momoh “Why Nigeria is yet to take advantage of AGOA” (30 May 2011) Business
Day, available at: <http://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/entrepreneur/entre
preneur-news/22233-why-nigeria-is-yet-to-take-advantage-of-agoa> (last accessed 9December
2011). For an earlier general assessment of AGOA, see C Van Grasstek “The African Growth
and Opportunity Act: A preliminary assessment” (2003, report for UN Conference on
Trade and Development): UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/2003/.1.
129 See generally the NEPAD framework document (October 2001), available at: <http://
www.nepad.org/system/files/framework_0.pdf> (last accessed 9 December 2011).
Information on NEPAD’s activities is available at: <http://www.nepad.org> (last accessed
9 December 2011).
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY -MAKING IN NIGER IA 
Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture, and
the Nigerian Employer’s Consultative Association currently constitute the
foremost participants in the OPS. However their contributions are still second-
ary to institutional (government-led) initiatives. The country requires both the
independent contributions of the individual constituents of the OPS (and not
the institutional responses of government bodies such as the Ministry of
Commerce) and the skills of persons learned in international economics
and international economic law, trade negotiators and policy makers, who
can dialogue and proffer suggestions beneficial to the country’s trade and
development policies.
With regard to economic and development policy-making in Nigeria, the
focus should therefore be on identifying and addressing the country’s devel-
opment needs in the context of a fast changing and rules oriented global mar-
ket system. In addition, the facts and the data upon which economic
projections and policies are based must be consistent with the availability of
finances and capacity (both technical and human) for their implementation
and achievement. The objective of effective policy-making is not, as has
been the case so far, the adoption of a large number of proposed reforms
by each subsequent political administration, but the adoption and implemen-
tation of crucial objectives that visibly impact the socio-economic environ-
ment in the country, even in the short term.
Finally, a troubling and telling absence in the process of economic and
development policy must be mentioned: the absence of the interpretative
function that is reserved for the courts. While the executive and legislature
engage constantly in advocating policies, the courts are barely involved in
their judicial review. Whatever issues arise from the manner and procedure
of policy implementation including administration, in either the private
environment or the public sector, they are rarely the subject of judicial
decisions. With little or no judicial review of the practices and procedures
undertaken in carrying out policies, there is no visible independent and
impartial assessment of their efficacy, legitimacy or legality, because cases
are hardly ever brought before the courts on these grounds. This dearth of
judicial review not only poses a problem, it is also a setback. This explains
the absence of a defined body of jurisprudence on the interpretation of
Nigerian government policy. It also demonstrates the limited progress of pub-
lic law and judicial review of administrative action. Significantly, it reveals the
limitations of the practice of the rule of law, since the activities of government
with regard to policy making and implementation are hardly ever subject to
judicial determination.
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